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 Russian identity is a complicated subject.  Discussions usually revolve around the extent 
to which Russia can be said to be European or not. The poet Alexander Pushkin, since the time 
of his death, has been a symbol of Russian identity and is seen to have articulated central 
components of Russian identity through works such as The Bronze Horseman and Eugene 
Onegin.  However, Pushkin also addressed a critical era in the formation of Russian identity: the 
Time of Troubles.  During this period Russian autocracy was strengthened and serfdom became 
further entrenched. This thesis will explore Alexander Pushkin’s interpretation of the Time of 
Troubles.   
 Understanding Pushkin’s view of Russian identity has been complicated by the fact that 
there are two versions of his historical play on the Time of Troubles.  One version, Boris 
Godunov, is a tragedy and has been used to support the idea of Pushkin as a supporter of 
autocracy.  The other, Comedy about Tsar Boris and Grishka Otrepiev, is a comedy and provides 
a contradicting view.  The work of scholars has demonstrated that Pushkin’s own view can best 
be understood as that reflected in the comedy, in which he presents a heroic Pretender and an 
active narod.   
 vi 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Cultural and political identities are constructed over time and by nature contentious.  
Russian identity is particularly contentious due to the confluence of several factors: obscure 
historical origins, geographic position, and long-standing great power struggles. Debates over 
Russian identity are neither the product of the Petrine Reform nor the Revolutionary era, but part 
of a larger process of continual redefinition, along with the emergence and evolution of the Russian 
state and empire.1 The intensity of these debates has increased over time. Disputes over Russia’s 
cultural and political orientation amplified after Russia’s ascension to European Great Power status 
during the reign of Peter the Great, with some rejecting and others embracing Westernizing reform.  
The debate intensified again during the nineteenth century due to the elimination of the Napoleonic 
threat and concurrent evolution of notions of political identities oriented around the nation and 
nationality.2 Debates over Russia’s cultural and political identity have been and continue to be 
heavily polarized along ideological lines, either embracing or repudiating Western political and 
cultural influences. 
                                                 
1 Nicholas Riasanovsky, Russian Identities: A Historical Survey, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 4 – 5 
 
2 William Mills Todd, Literature and Society in the Imperial Russia, 1800 – 1914, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978), 203; Paul Debreczeny, Social Functions of Literature: 
Alexander Pushkin and Russian Culture, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 225 
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 From the late nineteenth century through to the present day, the dominant symbol of 
Russian identity has been nineteenth century poet Alexander Pushkin.3  Pushkin’s ascent to 
monumental status was by no means a certainty at the time of his death.  Pushkin achieved and 
held his status for reasons that have less to do with his actual poetry and more to do with social 
and political developments.4 Pushkin served as a constant fixture for evolving conceptions of 
Russian identity and values.  Yet, Pushkin’s own writings articulated a less polarized vision of 
Russian cultural identity. 
 This paper will assess how Pushkin, poet and historian, assessed the process of the Russian 
history and its implications for Russian identity.  In particular, this paper will argue that though 
Pushkin was cultivated as Russia´s national poet, he directly challenged the idea of Russian 
nationality or narodnost’.  In order to entertain these questions this paper will first review the 
origins of the identity disputes and the adoption of Pushkin as a national symbol.  This will follow 
in the next two chapters.  Pushkin will be seen to symbolize values and attitudes that he did not 
hold. Efforts to challenge the established image of the national poet have been viewed as acts of 
aggression against an entire population. 
 Pushkin most directly challenged the ideas of Autocracy and Narodnost’ in his play Boris 
Godunov. Boris Godunov addresses a critical juncture in Russian history: the Time of Troubles, 
which led to the establishment of the Romanov dynasty in 1613.  In addition, the Time of Troubles 
resulted in the strengthening of the pillars of Russian identity: Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and 
                                                 
3 Catherine Theimer Nopomnyshchy, “Introduction” in Abraham Tertz Strolls with Pushkin, 
trans. Nepomnyashchy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 27 
 
4 Debreczeny, 245 
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Nationality.5 An important, yet controversial aspect of this period is the identity of the pretender 
Dmitry. Dmitry’s identity cannot be known with certainty and his image was darkened by the 
propaganda of his opponents, who portrayed him as a devil and sorcerer who defiled true Russian 
customs.6 Pushkin departed from official historiography in depicting the Pretender Dmitry as a 
positive hero with the real support of the Russian people.7 Chapter four will address Pushkin’s 
portrayal of the Pretender Dmitry.   
 Significantly, in Boris Godunov, Pushkin also addresses the nature of the Russian people’s 
support for the Pretender Dmitry.  Autocracy was frequently justified by appealing to the lethargic 
and passive quality of the Russian people, who were incapable of understanding their political 
interests. Support was either coerced or blind obedience. In Boris Godunov, Pushkin portrayed a 
narod that was active and rational.  Unfortunately, this portrayal of the Russian narod did not 
appear in the official, censored version of the play published in 1831. Chapter five will discuss 
Pushkin’s controversial portrayal the narod in Boris Godunov. 
 This thesis concludes that though Pushkin has been cultivated as the national poet and 
embodiment of national ideals, the reality was much different.  Instead the poet had a critical and 
subversive nature that is best illustrated in his 1825 Comedy about Tsar Boris and Grishka 
Otrepiev. 
                                                 
5 Chester Dunning, Russia’s First Civil War: the Time of Troubles and the Founding of the 
Romanov Dynasty, (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 464 
 
6 Dunning, 2001, 130 - 131 
 
7 Chester Dunning, “The Exiled Poet-Historian and the Creation of His Comedy” in Chester 
Dunning ed., The Uncensored Boris Godunov: The Case for Pushkin’s Original Comedy, 






IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION AND RUSSIAN HISTORY 
 “Pushkin’s name immediately calls to mind the thought of a Russian national 
poet…Pushkin is an extraordinary phenomenon and perhaps the only manifestation of the 
Russian spirit…In him the Russian nature, the Russian soul, the Russian language, the Russian 
character are reflected with the same purity the same purified beauty in which a landscape is 
reflected on the convex surface of an optical glass.” 8 
 
Quoted above are words written by Nikolai Gogol published in 1834, a few years prior to 
Pushkin’s death.  Defining Russian identity was a major concern for Russian writers and 
intellectuals in the 1830s. As of this time, Russian intellectuals had yet to take a major step in 
identity construction and establish a positive national myth. 9 A central figure with which to 
identify Russian society and culture was lacking also. Identifying a national bard to symbolize and 
articulate culture is the result of anxiety over national identity, which in turn was the result of 
several factors.   Included among them are geographic location, long-term divergent paths of 
historical development, and short-term historical events like the victory of 1812 over Napoleon 
and the disappointment of the Decembrist Revolt in 1825. Typically, discussions of identity 
                                                 
8 Quoted in Nepomnyashchy, 27 
 
9 Rozaliya Cherepanova, “Discourse on a Russian "Sonderweg": European models in Russian 
disguise” Studies in East European Thought, Vol. 62, No. 3/4, Crossing Boundaries: Russian 





disputes in Russia focus on the nineteenth century and nationalism. 10 Yet, the project of identity 
building did not begin in the nineteenth century, nor did it originate as a movement of a people 
seeking to define themselves.  Much of the process of identity creation in Russia has been top-
down and reactionary and centering upon eighteenth century developments. 11   
 
Identity Creation from Above 
 Discussions of Russian identity are intertwined with the idea of Sonderweg, a separate and 
special path.  The concept of a special path is debatable. One scholar has observed that the lingering 
preoccupation with Russian identity implies that both Russian and Europe have failed to identify 
real, fundamental differences between themselves, despite many statements to the contrary. 12 
However, enough significant developmental differences do exist between Russia and Europe to 
make the idea of a Sonderweg appear plausible.  
Frequently cited historical examples used to bolster claims of Russia’s special path are 
delayed political development, isolation from European cultural and intellectual movements such 
as the Renaissance and Reformation, forced Westernization alongside the persistence of coerced 
servitude in the form of serfdom.  The idea of a special path can have either positive or negative 
connotations.  Either way, the idea of Russia’s separate history is critical in disputes over Russian 
identity.  Whether or not the special path is conceived positively or negatively, attempts at 
                                                 
10 Luba Golburt, First Epoch: The Eighteenth Century and the Russian Cultural Imagination. 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014), 4 
 
11 Cherepanova, 318 
 




understanding Russian history revolve around understanding “what went wrong”, where the 
divergence really began or whether or not convergence was ever a real possibility.  
 Russia’s isolation from Europe during the era of Mongol domination in the thirteenth 
century partly explains the developing sense of separateness. The period of Mongol domination 
has been used to justify the view of Russia possessing a civilization distinct from the West.  In 
reality, though, the Horde’s influence over Muscovy was less than Moorish influence in Spain. 
Muscovy was simply part of a large tribute network, intermittently raided, and regularly subject to 
heavy taxation.13  
The idea of separateness can best be explained not by an action imposed from the outside, 
but from a choice made from the center of power: conversion to Christianity.  The state mandated 
conversion to Orthodox Christianity and not Roman Catholicism had profound implications for 
the development of Russian identity in the long-term.  In an era when identity was defined not by 
language or monarch, but by religion and membership in a sacred community, the Russian state 
and culture could only be perceived as separate from Western Europe under the Catholic Church. 
For example, the seventeenth century French historian, Jacques Margeret, in his work on the Time 
of Troubles in Russia, explained that his work would help “remove the false opinion held by many 
who believe that Christianity extends no further than Hungary.”14 Embracing Orthodoxy instead 
                                                 
13 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., “Russia, Europe, and ‘Western Civilization’” in Stephen Kotkin and 
Catherine Evtuhov, eds., The Cultural Gradient: The Transmission of Ideas in Europe, 1789 – 
1991, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 233 
 
14 Jacques Margeret, The Russian Empire and Grand Duchy of Muscovy: A 17th Century 
Account, trans. Chester Dunning, (Pittsburg: Pittsburg University Press, 1983), 3 
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of Roman Catholicism also later contributed to Russian suspicions of the West, and poor relations 
between Russia and Poland.15  
The adoption of Orthodox Christianity by Prince Vladimir in 988 placed the Russian polity 
within the cultural and political boundaries of the legacy of Byzantium rather than Rome.16 In 
addition, it is possible that without this acceptance of Orthodox Christianity, Russia may have 
embraced Islam instead. In embracing Orthodoxy, Prince Vladimir “chose to become the eastern 
flank of Christendom rather than an extension into Europe of non-Christian civilizations.”17 The 
fall of Constantinople in 1453 to the Ottoman Empire marks a turning point.  Muscovy then 
became the professed protector of Eastern Orthodoxy.18  When in the sixteenth century, the unity 
of Europe under the Catholic Church was broken by the Reformation, Orthodoxy could claim to 
have the monopoly on true Christian teaching and heritage.19   
                                                 
15 Nicholas Riasanovsky, Russian Identities: A Historical Survey, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 20 
 
16 Both Slavophiles and Westernizers see Russia´s conversion to Orthodox Christianity as a 
defining moment in Russian history, separating Russia from the West.  Russian Jesuit Ivan 
Gagarin disagreed and argued that the religious separation of Russia from the West was a 
gradual process only completed with the rise of Muscovy. Andrzej Walicki, ¨The Religious 
Westernism of Ivan Gagarin” in Catherine Evtuhov and Stephen Kotkin, eds., The Cultural 
Gradient: The Transmission of Ideas in Europe, 1789 – 1991, (New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2003), 40 
 
17 Riasanovsky, 2005, 20 
 
18 Laurence Dickey, “The ‘Geography of Salvation’”, in Stephen Kotkin and Catherine Evtuhov, 
25 
 
19 Jack F. Matlock, Jr. notes that while to scholars like Arnold Toynbee and Samuel Huntington, 
a core religion is the most important element in defining distinct civilizations, these scholars do 
not consider the rift between Catholics and Protestants to have caused a fundamental rift in 
Western Civilization.  Yet, the schism between Rome and Constantinople in 1054 did.  “Russia, 




The concept of the Third Rome, articulated by Pskovian monk Filofei in the 16th century, 
imagined Moscow as holy heir to the spiritual treasures of Rome and Constantinople, for two 
“Romes have fallen, but the Third stands fast; a fourth there cannot be.” 20  Russia’s special path in 
this understanding has divine origins and messianic implications, an idea appealing to the 
Slavophiles in the nineteenth century.21  However, Russia’s membership in the Orthodox Christian 
community resulted from a decision made by the state, not the people. Also, in the sixteenth 
century, Muscovy had appealed to the legacies of both the Golden Horde and Byzantine 
Christianity as justification for expansion. After the Time of Troubles and rise of the Romanov 
dynasty the Horde’s legacy was left behind.22 
Another major turning point in the construction of Russian identity is the process of 
Westernization undertaken early in the eighteenth century by Peter the Great.  This cultural 
revolution was driven by military needs and state mandated.23  Peter’s reforms were wide ranging 
from the creation of a meritocracy in the Table of Ranks to simplifying the Russian alphabet. He 
brought the European print revolution to Russia and by his death Russia would have ten printing 
presses.24 Much of the cultural reform was aimed at secularization, a process already begun in 
                                                 
20 Filofei quoted in Zara Martirosova Torlone, Russia and the Classics: Poetry’s Foreign Muse, 
(London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 2009), 13 
21 Laurence Dickey, “The ‘Geography of Salvation’”, in Stephen Kotkin and Catherine Evtuhov, 
15 
 
22 Michael Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500 – 
1800, (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2002), 222 
 
23 James Cracraft, The Petrine Revolution in Russian Culture, (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2004), 
12; 158 
 




Europe.  Peter’s use of titles such as Imperator and his Roman style victory celebrations are small 
examples of a meaningful shift in emphasis. Conversion to Orthodox Christianity implied a 
rejection of the spiritual legacy of Rome, but Peter’s cultural reform embraced the political legacy 
of Rome. Peter chose to embrace the secular legacy of Roman civilization as part of the process of 
cultural Westernization.  The architectural principles utilized in constructing St. Petersburg were 
European and classical.  The adoption of this heritage was a statement of equality with Europe.  
Both could claim the legacy of Augustus.  Peter could do so by stressing the Romanov link to Ivan 
IV, who claimed descent from Rurik, who claimed descent from Augustus.25 
Peter is also responsible for the creation of the Russian intelligentsia. The development of 
the Russian intelligentsia is often described in the context of the path to revolution. The 
intelligentsia in Russia are portrayed as outsiders in their own government and nation, and 
described as having grown up in isolation and opposition to the government, as European “in its 
occupations, its views, and it ways of thinking” and therefore conflicting with an Asiatic 
autocracy.26 Andrzej Walicki has pointed out that this new class created by Peter´s Westernizing 
reforms became overly receptive to revolutionary ideas and during the reign of Catherine the Great 
were saturated with the ideals of the French thinkers who set the path for revolution.27  Yet, 
intellectual culture in Russia during the eighteenth century supported state-driven priorities and 
was supported by the state. 
                                                 
25 Torlone, 2009, 15 
 
26 Boris Kagarlitsky, The Thinking Reed: Intellectuals and the Soviet State, 1917 to the Present, 
trans. Brian Pearce, (New York: Verso, 1988), 13 
 
27 Andrzej Walicki, ¨The Religious Westernism of Ivan Gagarin” in Catherine Evtuhov and 




Before Peter’s reform, Russian intellectual life was dictated by the Church and literature 
had an “equal appeal to all classes in society”, because of their religious training.  Peter’s reform 
allowed the aristocracy to break away from the Church and create new forms of art and literature 
for their own audience.28 While the cultural revolution of Peter the Great is often cited as having 
alienated the upper, literate classes from the rest of Russian society and causing the crisis of 
identity, Peter’s reforms resulted in new articulations of Russian identity in the form of historical 
works. Vasily Tatishchev, who had served Peter the Great in the Foreign Office as well as governor 
of Astrakhan, wrote the first full history of Russia, Russian History from the Earliest Times.  In 
this work, published in the 1760s, Tatishchev portrayed autocracy as the ideal form of governance 
in Russia.29 This can be said to reflect the shift in conceptualizing identity from religious terms to 
secular and political terms in post-Westphalia Europe.   
Catherine, who reigned from 1762 to 1796, furthered the creation of Russian identity by 
extending the process of seeking Russia’s history.  She mandated historical projects, as seen in her 
1783 order directing Count Andrei Petrovich Shuvalov to oversee the completion of notes 
concerning ancient history relevant to Russia. Further, Catherine herself participated in 
constructing Russia’s history through her Historical Notes and historical dramas. 30  Catherine the 
Great focused her creative energies on works that demonstrated the strength and justice of the 
autocratic regime. Works expressing anti-autocratic viewpoints were suppressed.31 In Russia, 
                                                 
28 George Vernadsky, A History of Russia, (New Haven: Bantam, 1961), 193 
29 Andrew Wachtel, An Obsession with History: Russian Writers Confront the Past, (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1994), 21 
 
30Wachtel, 31 
31 For example, the 1789 Vadim of Novgorod by Yakov Kniaznhnin. Dunning, Chester ed., The 
Uncensored Boris Godunov: The Case for Pushkin’s Original Comedy, (Madison: University of 
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identity creation began as a top-down endeavor with rulers taking direct and influential roles, 
though to a significantly limited audience, the court. Two things are significant about the focus of 
these top-down historical endeavors from both Peter and Catherine: the use of secular political 
concepts and the emphasis on the legitimacy of autocracy that was, according to Catherine and 
others, a proven fact of Russian history.  
 The process of identity construction continued in the nineteenth century, after Absolutism 
had been embraced by the rulers of Russia, who saw themselves as the enlighteners of their 
people.32 Alexander I appointed Nikolai Karamzin as the official state historian. In 1812, Karamzin 
composed his Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia for Alexander I, in which he encouraged the 
tsar not to move away from the autocratic principle: “Autocracy founded and resuscitated Russia. 
Any change in her political constitution has led in the past and must lead in the future to her 
perdition, for she consists of very many and very different parts, each of which has its own special 
civic needs; what save unlimited monarchy can produce in such a machine the required unity of 
action.”33 
                                                 
Wisconsin Press, 2006), 58; Catherine supported the Norman theory because it can be used to 
justify the rule of an outsider like herself, Wachtel, 1994, 25; Also Johann August von Kotzbue 
was forced by the Russian government to change the title of his play, Demetrius Iwanowitsch. 
Zaar von Moscau, removing the word ‘zaar’ lest it suggest that Dmitry was anything but a 
pretender. Dunning, 2006, 72 
 
32 It has been noted that in the West the rise of absolutism and the creation of civil society went 
together and rested on an unwritten constitutionalism. Malia, 1999, 27; James Cracraft discusses 
the promulgation of an absolutist theory similar to Bossuet found in Pravda voli monarshe vo 
opredelenii nas lednika derzhavy svoei. Cracraft, 2003, 66 
 
33 Karamzin in Richard Pipes, Karamzin’s Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia: A Translation 
and Analysis, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 139 
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  Karamzin also published the Istoriia rossiiskogo gosudarstva in twelve volumes from 
1818 to 1826. In this work, the true force of progress in Russia is shown to be the tsarist state.34 
Like Catherine, he too held history to have a moral and educative purpose.  However, his historical 
writing reached a broader audience. History, according to Karamzin, demonstrates that when 
Russia embraces autocracy, she embraces stability and civilization. Moving away from autocracy, 
is a move into chaos. Such ideas echo conservatives ideologies found in Western Europe 
advocating traditional monarchy like Louis de Bonald, who held that society returned to savagery 
when Christianity and monarchy were abandoned. 
Karamzin’s historical works not only justified the merits of an autocratic regime and 
underscored the dangers of moving away from autocracy, but also commented on the reign of Peter 
the Great.  While placing Peter’s achievement in the broader context of centralizing project 
undertaken by the Muscovite princes, he described the fatal mistake of Peter as having failed to 
“realize that the national spirit, constitutes the moral strength of the states.”35 Peter’s ridicule of 
native customs had long term implications for both people and regime. Peter’s reform is described 
as having been accomplished through “tortures and executions.”36  The founding of the new capital 
was “on tears and corpses.”37 Further, criticizing the activities of his contemporaries stating that 
prior to the eighteenth century it was inconceivable for “a Russian lord, who owed everything to 
                                                 
34 Wachtel, 36; The publication of Karamzin’s work was an event. Pushkin wrote that Karamzin 
“discovered ancient Russia as Columbus discovered America.” Quoted in Wachtel, 47 
 
35 Karamzin, trans. Pipes, 2005, 121 
 
36 Karamzin, trans. Pipes, 2005, 124 
 




his fatherland, gaily to abandon his tsar forever, in order to sit in Paris, London, or Vienna, and 
calmly read in the newspapers of the perils confronting our country.”38   
Later on, Nicholas I, who reigned from 1825 to 1855, also conceived of himself as an 
enlightened autocrat whose duty it was to educate his people and himself sponsored artists, writers, 
and scientists.39  Nicholas appointed Alexander Pushkin as his official court historian. However, 
in the nineteenth century constructing identity required more than religious or political concepts.  
It was critical to identify the nation or essence of the people. For Nicholas and his supporters the 
essence of the Russian people was their devotion to autocracy. Identity construction in the 
nineteenth century was no longer a purely top-down process, but a task undertaken separately by 
educated elite and government.   Against this background, the regime singled out the three defining 
concepts of Russian identity: Orthodoxy, not Catholicism; Autocracy, not parliamentary 
institutions; and Nationality found in communal traditions, not individualism of capitalist West.40 
Official Nationality was formally articulated by Education Minister Serge Uvarov in 1832 and was 
cultivated at universities and permeated Nicholas’s domestic and foreign policy.41 While parts of 
this formula were embraced by the Slavophile movement, it too originated at the top. 
 
                                                 
38 Karamzin, trans. Pipes, 2005, 124 
 
39 Cherepanova, 327 
 
40 Cherepanova, 315; Martin Malia observed that Nicholas championed absolute monarchy at a 
time out of synch with Western Europe.  Nicholas’s Russia was a European state of the past, a 
European Old Regime. Russia Under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin 
Mausoleum, (Cambridge: Belknap, 1999), 139 
 
41 Nicholas Riasanovksy, “’Nationality’ in the State Ideology during the Reign of Nicholas I” in 




Reactionary Nature of Russian Identity Construction 
Regardless of where the special path begins, it can be understood as reactionary.  The 
identity debate in Russia and the concept of a special path are both reactions to events and 
processes occurring in Europe.42  Political and economic development resulted in a geographic 
shift of power that reflected significant political and economic shifts of power from Southern 
Europe and the Mediterranean to North West Europe and the Atlantic. 43 Modernization leads to 
crises in identity that invite new understandings of identity, creating an environment where the 
idea of a special path is highly attractive.  Identity crises, then, are not to be understood as problems 
unique to industrial societies.44  
  If the construction of European identity occurred during the Enlightenment, and the 
unifying source of identity could no longer be found in the idea of Christendom, secular notions 
of rational civilization came to the foreground.  Here, the issue of religious affiliation is not just 
relevant for articulating Russian identity internally, but externally as well.  This similarity, and yet 
difference in the form of Christianity, allowed for Russia to be considered almost an equal. In the 
eighteenth century, Russia provided the chaotic backdrop against which the orderly, rational, and 
humanitarian Europe could be contrasted.45 The link of Christianity made Russia a more suitable 
                                                 
42 Cherepanova, 318 
 
43 Vesa Oittinen, “Russian ‘otherness’: from Chaadaev to the present day”, in Alapuro, Risto, 
Mustajoki, Arto, and Pesonen, Pekka, eds. Routledge Advances in Sociology: Understanding 
Russianness. (Florence: Routledge, 2011), 70 
 
44 Cherepanova, 316 
 




partner than the Ottoman Empire.46 Orthodox Russia was different but fundamentally similar, 
allowing the concept to be flexible according to the need of the situation.  Russia could at different 
times be a member of the European community of states, and an outsider.47 Chinese and Arabic 
civilization would not fit neatly into this construction because of the high level of advancement at 
a time when European civilization was beset by instability, warfare, and cultural backwardness in 
the Middle Ages. 
Enlightenment European opinions of Russia frequently described the lack of order and the 
political backwardness.48 For example, enlightened Absolutist Frederick the Great, admitting that 
Prussia had not yet attained the civilized standard of Bourbon France, referred to Russia as semi-
barbaric. 49  As the Enlightenment discourse developed, the image of Russia became increasingly 
backward and barbaric so that European thinkers in the nineteenth century could refer to Russia as 
a “bloody mass of Mongol servitude.” 50  Also increasing in direct proportion to the concept of a 
civilized and rational Europe, was the idea of Russia’s distinctiveness.   
In the nineteenth century, the failure of Russia to adopt a constitutional monarchy, a more 
rational form of governance, in 1825 seemed to affirm the separateness and special path of Russian 
development. 51  The Decembrists in 1825 demanded an accountable constitutional government, 
                                                 
46 Malia, 1999, 41 
47 Cherepanova, 318 
 
48 Oittinen, 72 
 
49 Malia, 1999, 36 
 
50 Karl Marx, Revelations of the Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century,1899, quoted in 
Oittinen, 72 
 




like that of Western Europe.  However, it is unlikely that their cause would have ever succeeded 
as Nicholas’s brother, Constantine, whose accession the Decembrists championed, was every bit 
as reactionary as Nicholas.  Further, Constantine felt that the government was in fact not harsh 
enough toward the Decembrists. 52 
Though Catherine the Great took initiative for developing and extending historical 
consciousness in Russia, her efforts too can be understood as reactionary.  In the preface to the 
1783 Notes Concerning Russian History, Catherine wrote that these were “composed for our youth 
at a time when books calling themselves histories of Russia have been appearing in foreign 
languages.  But these books should really be called biased creations, since every page bears witness 
to the hatred with which they were written.” 53 Catherine was reacting to Enlightenment portrayals 
of Russia.  
Catherine’s reign produced Russia’s first “intelligent” and social critic, Nikolai Novikov.  
Novikov engaged the monarch in journalistic debate.  He attacked what he saw as vices of the 
aristocracy and a slavish devotion to things French.  Novikov looked to Russia’s own ancient 
history and culture, not questioning autocracy or serfdom.54  Other late-eighteenth century Russian 
writers voiced criticism of the European orientation of the government and upper classes.  Denis 
Fonvizin held Paris to be a center of decadence and French philosophers to be hypocritical and 
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materialistic.55  Historian Mikhail M. Shcherbatov wrote of the corruption of morals and satirized 
the reforms of Peter the Great in his 1784 Journey to the Land of Ophir.56  Common to these 
writers is an anti-European focus.  True virtue was to come from the natural and religious customs 
of the Russian people. 
By Pushkin’s time, by the reign of Nicholas I, Russia had finally produced an educated 
elite “so bold as to demand, in the persons of the Decembrists, that tsarism liberalize with the 
times.”57 However, their failure illustrated the unwillingness of the regime to adapt.  Instead, 
Nicholas I aimed at strengthening the autocracy, which he saw as the preservation of order in a 
chaotic Europe.  He believed he was preserving the spirit of Peter in the autocratic principle.  Worth 
remembering is the fact that according to the theory of absolutist rule embraced by Peter and 
Nicholas, the monarch is morally bound to serve the common good.   
In the nineteenth century, the identity debates can also be described as reactions to external 
and internal factors. Externally, the impact of Napoleon and Napoleon’s invasion of Russia 
provided fuel to the construction of Russian identity.  Success in the Napoleonic wars appeared to 
both vindicate the autocratic regime and increased the desire for social reform.  Liberal and 
Romantic principles supported social reform. Yet, the failure of Russia to adopt a constitutional 
monarchy after 1825 led to pessimistic formulations of Russia’s history.  
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Pyotr Chaadaev, influenced as much by Romanticism58 as by Christianity’s formulation of 
mission driven history, wrote that Russian did  
“not belong to any of the great families of the human race; we are neither 
of the West nor of the East, and we have not the tradition of either.  Placed, 
as it were, outside time, we have not been touched by the universal 
education of the human race…What is the life of man, says Cicero, if 
memory of earlier events does not relate the present to the past?  But we, 
who have come into the world like illegitimate children, without a heritage, 
without any ties binding us to the men who came before us on this earth, 
carry in our hearts none of the lessons preceding our own existence…”59 
Chaadaev’s Eight Philosophical Letters, which were never published in his lifetime but circulated 
in manuscripts, opened the long debate between Westernizers and Slavophiles.60  They also earned 
him a declaration of insanity from the Tsar himself. 
Just as Europe could define itself in contrast to Russia.  Russia could also be defined in 
contrast to the West. After the July Revolution and the Polish Revolt of 1830, the tsarist 
government became the Gendarme of Europe. Opponents of Chaadaev’s critique of the Russian 
                                                 
58 It is unknown for sure when Chaadaev read Guizot.  However, it is possible that his 
Philosophical Letters was, at least partially, a reaction to Guizot’s framework for evaluating 
civilizations.  Catherine Evtuhov, “Guizot in Russia”, in Stephen Kotkin and Catherine Evtuhov, 
58 
 
59 Chaadaev, quoted in Torlone, 2009, 11; a sentiment echoed by twentieth century British 
historian J. A. R. Marriott who stated that “Russia is not, and has never been, a member of the 
European family.” Quoted in “Russia, Europe, and ‘Western Civilization’”, in Stephen Kotkin and 
Catherine Evtuhov, 229 
 
60 Andrzej Walicki, ¨The Religious Westernism of Ivan Gagarin” in Catherine Evtuhov and 
Stephen Kotkin, 35; the author discussed the influence of Chaadaev on Prince Ivan Sergeevich 
Gagarin who not only embraced Catholicism by joined the Jesuit Order. While Chaadaev held 
that Russia’s embrace of Orthodoxy cut her off from Europe and history, Gagarin argued that 
Russia had a true, Catholic past and could find her true identity through reconnecting to the 
Catholic Church.  While Chaadaev held a positive view of Peter the Great, Gagarin’s view was 




system, encompass another articulation of Russian identity: the Slavophile movement that 
included such thinkers as Ivan Kireevsky, Alexei Khomiakov, and Konstantin Aksakov. The 
Slavophiles, echoing earlier writers such as Denis Fonvizin and historian Mikhail Shcherbatov, 
articulated wariness of the Western path and harped on the spiritual poverty and materialism of 
the West. European history was the unfolding of “perverse spiritual principles”.61 Liberal political 
ideals led to instability and turbulence.  Peace and stability could be found by embracing the 
patriarchal culture of the Orthodox peasant mir, and not Western political ideas or culture.  
 In the Slavophile vision, Russianness is not only a difference in nationality, but in 
rationality, as Vesa Oittinen observed.62 It is a rejection of Enlightenment principles of rationality, 
hence the persistence of Orthodoxy as a critical part of Russian identity. 63  Further, the Slavophile 
movement blurred the distinction between the secular and spiritual realm, instead advocating a 
vision of salvation on earth that set the precedent for later radical and communist ideas.  The 
Slavophiles, who in general accepted the three pillars of Official Nationality were a Russian 
rendition of revolutionary nationalisms present in the nineteenth century, as Walicki noted.64 
Counter to the Slavophiles, who idealized religion and the peasantry, were the 
Westernizers.  In addition to Chaadaev, Westernizers included such thinkers as Alexander Herzen, 
Mikhail Bakunin, and Vissarion Belinsky.  This school of thought is diverse and united only its 
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opposition the doctrines of the Slavophiles.65  Members of this circle are noted for having 
embraced Western modes of thought and institutions. They adopted a critical approach to religion 
and politics.66  Vissarion Belinsky, for example, held that  
“Russia sees her salvation not in mysticism or aestheticism or piety, but in 
the achievements of education, civilization, and humane culture. She has no 
need of sermons (for she has heard too many), nor of prayers (she has 
mumbled too many), but of the awakening in the people of a feeling of 
human dignity, lost for so many ages in the mud and filth.  It needs laws 
and rights in accordance not with the teachings of the Church, but those of 
common sense and justice…”67  
Where Slavophiles vilified Peter the Great and his reform, Westernizers praised him. 
The government’s articulation of Russian identity in Nicholas’s Official Nationality 
incorporate ideas from both schools of thought.  Like the Slavophiles, Official Nationality holds 
that the Russian people are unique and spiritually superior to the West.68  But, like the 
Westernizers, Official Nationality holds that the nation is embodied in the person of the Absolute 
monarch who has perfected Peter’s accomplishment of establishing European absolute monarchy 
in Russia.69 
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In conclusion, the problem of Russian identity is one that precedes the revolutionary 
activity of the twentieth century, the perceived backward political structure of Nicholas I, and the 
reforms of Peter the Great.  The identity question is a reflection of the power politics that have 
existed since the creation of the Russian polity and have altered in response to changing notions 
of state structures and political identification.  The characterization of Russia as non-Western, or 
non-European has served European political needs first and then been adopted and cultivated by 
Russian intellectuals, who often present an image not a Russia equal to Europe, but a Russia that 
is inherently superior and occupying a higher plane of moral existence.  The terms of the identity 
disputes have been dictated by Russian reactions to European ideas.  
During the nineteenth century, identity debates became particularly heated and pressing 
due to a combination of circumstances, the success of 1812, which seemed to validate the Russian 
system; nationalism and the need to define a “people”. Combining all of these factors was the late 
development of a public literary arena for discussion of such issues and a growing historical 
consciousness developed by nineteenth century Russian writers, who in general had polarized 












PUSHKIN THE SYMBOL 
Веленью божию, о муза, будь послушна 
Обиды не страшась, не требуя венца, 
Хвалу и клевету приемли равнодушно, 
И не оспаривай глупца.  
To God and his commands pay Thou good heed, O Muse. 
To praise and slander both be nonchalant and cool. 
Demand no laureate's wreath, think nothing of abuse, 
               And never argue with a fool.70 
 
Alexander Pushkin was born in 1799 to an aristocratic family that had lost influence and 
wealth, yet maintained the outward appearances of their station.  Pushkin was never particularly 
close to either of his parents and was more at home at school. From 1811 to 1817 he was educated 
at the Lycee in Tsarskoe Selo, which was the most progressive educational institution in Russia. 
Pushkin was part of its first class. Emperor Alexander I presided over his final examination in 
1817. During these years he developed superb command of French and was introduced to classical 
and neoclassical writers. Though he was intelligent, he was never more than a mediocre student 
and graduated at the bottom of his class.71 At Lycee, Pushkin became a member of the Arzamas 
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Society of Obscure Men. This literary society of like-minded friends was dedicated to furthering 
Russian literary endeavors.  Members of Arzamas include the Turgenev brothers Alexander and 
Nikolai, Nikita Muraviev, as well as Nikolai Karamzin.  Members of the Arzamas society were 
followers of Karamzin, before he articulated a very different view of Russian history. They were 
critical of conservatism and serfdom.  Their meetings and rituals were full of parody, ridiculing 
the meetings of the conservative literary society, the Lovers of the Russian Word or Beseda, as 
well as other religious rituals.  The comic tone and ideas of Arzamas were subversive.72   Pushkin 
was actually the first among the Arzamas Society to be subject to punitive action by the regime in 
response to his political ideas found in the 1820 poem Ode to Liberty, whose title referred the work 
of the seditious challenger of serfdom Alexander Radishchev.73  The main points of Pushkin’s 
criticism were directed at unlimited autocracy, the institution of serfdom, and the complicity of 
Alexander I in his father’s assassination.  Several members of this society went on to participate 
in the Decembrist revolt. Pushkin did not.  
At the time of the Decembrist Revolt Pushkin was in exile for his Ode to Liberty. He had 
been exiled to the southern provinces of Kishinev and Odessa from 1820 to 1824, after which he 
was sent to his family estate at Mikhailovskoe where he was still under surveillance and 
scrutinized.74  If not for the intercession of people like his mentor Nikolai Karamzin, and friends 
Vasily Zhukovsky and Pyotr Chaadaev (members of his circle in the Arzamas Society), Pushkin 
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may have found himself exiled to Siberia.  The degree of the punishment is an indication that Tsar 
Alexander did in fact fear the influence of Pushkin’s ideas. 75  Exile provided him the opportunity 
to study and appreciate that his family had long included rebels and dissidents76: Противен мне 
род Пушкиных мятежный.77   
Upon returning to Moscow in 1826 Pushkin was given an audience with Tsar Nicholas.  It 
is said that at this meeting the two men came to a truce, Pushkin admitting that he would have 
taken part in the Decembrist Revolt and Nicholas accepting.  Nicholas would be Pushkin’s 
personal censor, while Pushkin agreed not to “contradict the accepted order.”78 Pushkin was also 
placed under the supervision of police-chief General Benckendorff. In 1831, Pushkin was 
appointed official Court Historiographer to Nicholas I and commissioned to write a history of Peter 
the Great.  While Pushkin appreciated the opportunity to research in the official archives, he did 
not enjoy life as a courtier.  
 Pushkin’s life ended on January 29, 1837, due to wounds received from a duel with 
Frenchman Georges D’Anthes, who was serving in the Russian guard.  This duel was caused by 
an insult to his wife’s honor. On November 4, 1836 Pushkin had received an anonymous letter 
stating that he had been appointed to a new post: Deputy Grand Master and Historiographer of the 
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Most Noble Order of Cuckholds.  Copies of this letter had been sent to several of his friends.  
Pushkin responded by challenging D’Anthes to a duel.79  
Pushkin spent his final days in excruciating pain and opium induced hallucinations. His 
death was a public event.  Thousands of people in St. Petersburg came to mourn the passing of the 
poet and view the body in his home.  The government felt it necessary to move Pushkin’s funeral 
to a smaller church and have the area barricaded by police.80  Sergei Uvarov, Minister of 
Education, expressed frustration that Pushkin’s death occasioned such displays of public emotion. 
After all he was a poet, not statesman or military leader.81 Pushkin would soon rise to becomes the 
recipient of public affection and remain as such.  Prior to Pushkin’ death, he composed Exegi 
Monumentum, appropriating the Horatian Ode for himself: Я помятник себе воздвиг 
нерукотворный/ К нему не заростет народная тропа.82  
  
Pushkin as a Symbol of Identity 
 Though the process of identity construction discussed in the previous chapter is seen to be 
top-down and reactionary, the same cannot be said for the adoption of Pushkin as a national 
symbol.  This occurrence did not originate from the center of power, but initially originated from 
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the intelligentsia’s search for a national symbol. However, the state managed to reassert control 
over shaping national identity.  By the end of the nineteenth century the government recognized 
the importance of Pushkin as a national symbol, who had previously been adopted by liberals and 
radicals.  The tsarist regime then utilized Pushkin for its own ends, promoting unity and loyalty to 
the state domestically and advertising cultural achievement internationally.83  This process was 
repeated by successive regimes. Pushkin maintained his position in each one.  The poet of freedom, 
became enslaved to a series of national myths, and “not one of Pushkin’s admirers would allow 
you to be free of Pushkin himself.”84 His image would be “refracted as every hue of the rainbow.”85   
He became the Holy Spirit of Russian Culture. 86  Pushkin and his works have been kept alive by 
interaction of cultural processes, filtration and adaption, social circumstances, psychological needs 
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and the political need for a national symbol.87 Stephanie Sandler has observed that Pushkin retains 
place in the cultural imagination because of his ability to be “our” Pushkin and “my Pushkin.”88 
Calls for a national poet came as early as the 1820s. Slavophil Ivan Kireevsky in the late 
1820s, said that the national poet must embody the age. Poetry in and of itself is insufficient, he 
says, “it is also necessary to have been raised, as it were, in the midst of the nation’s life and to 
have shared in the fatherland’s hopes, aspirations, and passions- in short to live its life and to 
express it spontaneously while expressing oneself…”89 Ivan Kireevsky marks the first attempt to 
elevate Pushkin to national poet.  
Others did not agree. For example, social and literary critic, Westernizer Vissarion 
Belinsky did not think Pushkin an appropriate candidate for Russia’s national poet.  To him, 
Pushkin belonged to an era whose primary task was the imitation and translation of European 
models.  Further, though he does admit that the works of Pushkin “reveal the Russian soul, the 
clear and positive Russian mind and strength and depth of feeling”, foreigners will not be able to 
appreciate or comprehend this because the “Russian nationality is not yet sufficiently fashioned 
and developed for the Russian poet to place its sharply defined stamp upon his works.”90 In 
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contrast, the spirit of the nations of Western Europe are already sharply defined.  In addition to 
this developmental setback, Belinsky also states that the poet “who is not called by his own name 
cannot be considered equal to the man by whose name he is called.”91  However, Belinsky is 
responsible for popularizing the idea of Pushkin as the father of Russian literature.92  This idea is 
a critical component to the Pushkin myth.  Stalin, in 1950, claimed that modern Russian language 
was “Pushkin’s Russian”.93 
 
Property of the Literary Elite 
The year 1880 marks a turning point in the evolution of the Pushkin myth.  Here Pushkin 
officially became the national symbol of Russian culture, to whom a monument was erected.94 A 
bronze statue in Moscow, it was the first statue erected to memorialize a literary figure in any 
Russian city. The choice of literary figure rather than military hero or politician reflected the shift 
in conceptualizing identity. The Pushkin Days of 1880 were led by the literary elite who cultivated 
the sense of making history, referring to the occasion as an event of “huge importance for the 
history of our development and culture”95 and “a profound historical revolution in Russian life, 
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comparable to Russia’s conversion to Christianity or Peter the Great’s forced Westernization.” 96 
This event was to be a resolution to the opposition between state and increasingly radicalized 
nation, putting forth a position of compromise.97 It was an activity of the public, of society separate 
from the state and the radical intelligentsia. An indication that the era of Russian absolutism was 
nearing an end. Celebrating Pushkin was akin to an exercise in self-rule.98 
Pushkin was made into the ultimate Russian in the speeches of F. Dostoevsky and I. S. 
Turgenev.99 These speeches each represent different angles on the Pushkin myth.  Turgenev’s 
modest appraisal focused on Pushkin’s significance with respect to his role in the creation of a 
poetic and literary language for the Russian people.  This was, in his mind, a necessary step towards 
establishing a literary tradition.100  Here he disavowed the literary traditions of the eighteenth 
century as inauthentic, European imports.  Turgenev refrains from comparing Pushkin with the 
great poets and writers of the Western world, such as Schiller, Cervantes, or Shakespeare.  
Dostoevsky’s position was that Pushkin certainly cannot be compared to those poets because he is 
superior to them.   
Dostoevsky was last to speak. For Dostoevsky, it was Pushkin’s universality and pan-
human qualities that mark his superiority and signal his messianic calling.101  Summarizing the 
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main points of his speech Dostoevsky wrote that Pushkin arrived fortuitously as “we were just 
beginning to be conscious of ourselves” and that with his “purely Russian heart” was first to 
diagnose the pathological separation of the educated classes from the People, which Pushkin 
depicted in young men like Eugene Onegin, restless and alienated.  But, Pushkin also provided 
Russia with artistic types of beauty, seen in the figure of Tatiana.   
Further, Dostoevsky wrote that Pushkin has the unique ability to assume the form of the 
“geniuses of other nations” and that his universality was therefore also uniquely Russian, and a 
trait that Pushkin shares with his beloved People.102 Dostoevsky by writing that  
“the greatness of Pushkin as a guiding genius lay precisely in the fact that 
he, surrounded almost entirely by people who did not understand him, so 
quickly found a sure path, a great solution which we Russians had been 
longing for, and showed it to us.  This solution was nationality, turning to 
the People and bowing down to the truth of the Russian people…A Russian 
who fails to understand Pushkin has no right to call himself a Russian.”103 
 Dostoevsky went on to say how Pushkin understood the mission of the Russian people more 
deeply than any other and how he “testified to the universality and the all-embracing nature of the 
Russian spirit, thereby divining the future mission of the Russian genius within humanity as a 
whole as an all unifying, all-reconciling and all-regenerating principle.”  Here Dostoevsky makes 
Pushkin sound like a Christ-figure, supposed to reconcile all peoples to himself.104  
By 1887, fifty years after his death, Pushkin had been turned into national symbol and the 
ultimate Russian.  Pushkin represented about 12 – 18% of all books published in Russia at the 
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time.105 During the prerevolutionary era Pushkin was included in school readers with increasing 
variety toward the end of the era.106  Pushkin’s works were thought to have patriotic value and the 
ability to cultivate in the youth a love of Russian history. Yet, the next Pushkin commemoration 
would not focus on the poet’s death, but his birth marking a shift in control over the image of 
Pushkin.   
 
Possession of the Tsar 
By the one hundredth anniversary of his birth in 1899, Pushkin had moved from dissenting 
rebel to the sanctioned spokesman of Russian culture.107 The Pushkin of 1899 is an obedient 
subject of the tsar and an apologist for autocracy. The decision to commemorate birth rather than 
death, is significant to his image as a supporter of the tsarist regime.  The circumstances 
surrounding Pushkin’s death evolved into the myth of Pushkin as a martyr, with the martyrdom of 
Boris and Gleb from the Primary Chronicle as the model.108  Pushkin became a victim of high 
society, a victim of a tyrannical tsar. The idea of the martyred poet appealed to various sectors of 
Russia’s population who felt themselves to be suffering injustice at the hands of the autocratic 
regime.   
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By shifting the emphasis away from of his death and celebrating instead his birth, the 
regime could distance itself from the martyred poet and instead celebrate the loyal subject whose 
life and works well-served the tsarist regime and its people.  By the end of the nineteenth century, 
it was the regime that was appropriating and molding the Pushkin image.  For this regime, it was 
best to commemorate birth, not death.  In order to enhance the symbol of unity, celebrations at 
multiple sites in 1899 were synchronized. Children received copies of Pushkin’s works and candies 
with his face on them.109 This image of Pushkin lacked complexity as he was simplified into a 
symbol of national prestige that was geared toward ordinary people.110 
 
State Ownership 
After the revolution, members of the intelligentsia sought to reclaim Pushkin for 
themselves, to free the poet from the masses.  In 1921 during the “Pushkin Days” held in Petrograd 
members of the Russian intelligentsia celebrated the poet’s death as a way of distancing themselves 
from the culture of the old regime. Symbolist poet Alexander Blok gave a speech in which he 
blamed the poet’s death on the bureaucracy and stifling censorship.  To Blok, the unfortunate and 
mindless rabble that the poet had been victimized by was not the people, but the court of the 
aristocracy.111 However, the Pushkin commemorations of 1924 and 1949 also celebrated birth.   
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The Stalinist regime of the 1930s, shifted the commemoration back to the poet’s death.  
1937 was the Jubilee year celebrating the 100th anniversary of Pushkin’s death. This Jubilee 
celebration was part of the regime’s retreat from revolutionary ideal intended to help maintain the 
illusion of stability.  In fact, Stalin’s regime here revived the practice of venerating Pushkin, a 
tsarist innovation. Yet, it was also reminiscent of the practices of cult of Lenin.112 Elevating 
Pushkin served to elevate the Soviet regime and marked the consolidation of soviet power. The 
new regime created a new Pushkin, a representative of Soviet Man.113 The regime celebrated “the 
day of the death of the great Russian poet, creator of the Russian literary language, and founder of 
the new Russian literature- Alexander Sergeevich Pushkin, who enriched humankind with his 
immortal creations in artistic language”.114 Pushkin was a proto-revolutionary who would have 
supported the Soviet regime if only he had been blessed enough to have been born into this present 
era.  Though he was an aristocrat, he “first and foremost belongs profoundly to the people.”115 
 Pushkin, who had almost been thrown out with the tsarist regime during the early years of 
the revolution,116 again became a martyr. Here, he was again a victim of the tsarist regime, and 
also of foreign interference reflecting the world of Soviet foreign policy.  Pushkin’s martyrdom 
could be used to highlight all of the Soviet regimes enemies: foreigners, tsars, and any remnants 
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of the old regime. A newspaper described the poet’s death, “One hundred years ago, a passionate 
defender of all living things perished at the hands of a foreign scoundrel, the hireling of the Russian 
Tsar and of the reactionary aristocracy.”117 Works that emphasized the injustice of Pushkin’s 
death, such as Lermontov, author of Hero of Our Time, were reprinted, while others, like 
Dostoevsky, became distasteful. 118  The Pushkin of 1937 was monolithic and controlled by the 
state. 119   The same rhetoric that in the 1880s and 90s made the regime uneasy was not being used 
by the regime as part of the official myth. 
 
Liberated Pushkin? 
State appropriation of the Pushkin myth began in 1899 with the commemoration of his 
birth.  Whether or not in support of the tsarist regime or the Soviet regime, Pushkin’s image has 
been associated with national unity. Pushkin is imagined as a supporter of autocracy, reimagined 
as a true soviet citizen, and again reimagined as a supporter of conservative Russian values.  
Perceived attacks on Pushkin are interpreted as attacks on Russian national values, especially in 
the late 1980s as the Soviet Union declined. The critical component of the national Pushkin is his 
imagined freedom from western liberal ideals.120   One particularly interesting example of the 
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intensity these identity debates revolves around a very Pushkinesque publication: Strolls with 
Pushkin by Andrei Siniavskii under the pseudonym Abram Tertz. 
This work was published outside of the Soviet Union in 1975 and inside the Soviet Union 
in 1989.  Strolls with Pushkin managed to offend Russian patriots who objected to creative 
characterizations of Pushkin as female, as Jewish, and as a vampire. Patriots scorned the image of 
Pushkin running “into great poetry on thin erotic legs”.121  These playful re-imaginings of the 
beloved national symbol served to undermine the official image of Pushkin that had crystallized 
during Stalin’s regime.122 The author thought it necessary to forewarn readers against taking it too 
literally and missing the “heavy dose of irony, paradox, and distancing.”123 Members of the literary 
establishment showed they were incapable of entering into the author’s subversive mindset, 
viewing the work as a major attack in a long drawn out cultural battle.124 
 Strolls with Pushkin was referred to as “Russophobic” and a “desecration of great 
Pushkin” by critics. Its author was ostracized.125 Humor and irony directed at established cultural 
norms and images was simply too much to be tolerated.126 It displayed “hooliganism, and not petty 
hooliganism either, but a very serious matter.”127 Siniavskii presented readers with images of the 
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poet that challenged the conventional values promoted by the regime, yet the spirit of work was in 
greater harmony with Pushkin than any speech or publication from prior commemorations. The 
most basic convention challenged by Strolls with Pushkin is the image of the simple, 
uncomplicated poet “of the people”, whose work presented positive heroes and ideological 
certainty.128  
Two hundred years after Pushkin’s birth after the dissolution of the Soviet regime, 
Pushkin’s image was no longer controlled by the political center, but returned to the hands of civil 
society.  In 1999, many sectors of society competed for power over Pushkin, artists, poets, scholars, 
and vendors.129 Scholars during this jubilee were challenged to rethink commemoration, think 
critically about Pushkin’s central position in modern cultural self-definitions, “pull apart webs of 
meaning”, question whether systems must have centers, and remember that “hidden histories of 
identification, rewriting, misreading, and polemic remain to be uncovered…let us see anew how 
writers, poets, and creative artists have absorbed his influence yet, displaced, jostled with his work, 
and shared his glory in ways that rewrite his legacy entirely.”130  Pushkin’s image is still a 
contentious component of defining Russian identity.   
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REHABILITATING THE PRETENDER  
Да лет семи; ему бы ныне было 
(Тому прошло уж десять лет...нет больше: 
Двенадцать лет) – он был бы твой ровесник 
И царствовал;131 
Seven, he would have been; now he’d have been 
(Ten years have passed since then- no, more, say twelve), 
He would have been about your age…and tsar; 
 
While the Slavophiles and Westerners tended to focus their discussion on the reign of Peter 
the Great as the critical turning point in Russian history, the Time of Troubles in reality is a very 
important juncture in Russian history.132 It is because of this period that all of the pillars of what 
would become Official Nationality were strengthened.  Pushkin, interested in turning points and 
the confluence of chance, personality, and circumstance, dealt with the Time of Troubles in his 
play Boris Godunov.133  Approaching Pushkin’s interpretation in this play is complicated by the 
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fact that there are two editions: the 1831 published edition and the 1825 manuscript titled Komediia 
o tsare Borise i o Grishke Otrep’eve, that was not published during Pushkin’s life time. In a letter 
to a friend, Pushkin described this version as “full of good jokes and allusions to the history of the 
time.”134  In the 1831 version, Pushkin portrays an interpretation of the Time of Troubles very 
much in line with official history and in support of the regime’s concept of Russian identity.  
Recent work by Chester Dunning, however, has shown that in fact the 1825 version represents the 
author’s real interpretation of this critical period in Russian history.135   
Boris Godunov begins in 1598 in a Kremlin Palace and ends in 1605 with the deaths of 
Maria Godunova and her son Fedor.  The play was composed during Pushkin’s exile. He began 
working on the play in 1820 and finished in November of 1825 after have been at his mother’s 
estate for one year.  During this period, the poet was productive working on The Gypsies and Count 
Nulin in addition to his play on the Time of Troubles.136  All Pushkin’s attempts to publish the 
play prior to 1831 were frustrated.137 Instead, the play underwent a transformation that 
disappointed Pushkin’s personal friends and seems to more likely reflect the ideas of Tsar Nicholas 
I more than Pushkin.138 Nicholas, dismayed by both the July Revolution and the Polish revolt 
before Pushkin’s original could go to press, made the revised version of the play “not the product 
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of artistic revision, but a reflection of fear and political correctness at imperial court.”139 It is 
unknown for certain which changes to the text of Pushkin’s play were made by him, the censors, 
or his friend Zhukovsky.140  At the last minute, Pushkin changed the dedication from Zhukovsky 
to Karamzin.141 
 
Synopsis of the Time of Troubles 
 The Time of Troubles is a period of domestic and international conflict for Muscovy 
beginning in 1598 with the death of Fedor Ivanovich and ending in 1613 with the accession of the 
Romanov dynasty.  In 1604 someone claiming to be the dead tsarevich Dmitry invaded backed by 
a small army.  In 1605 Boris Godunov died and the Pretender Dmitry became tsar.  Dmitry was 
assassinated and there followed the reign of Vasily Shuisky, civil war, and the foreign intervention 
of Sweden and Poland. During the drawn-out conflict, not just one but several other pretenders 
appeared, numbering nine by 1611. The end of the Time of Troubles resulted in the election of 
Mikhail Romanov as tsar of Russia. The Time of Troubles in Russia was part of a broader struggle 
between decentralized, aristocratic states and the growing, centralized monarchies developing in 
the 16th and 17th centuries.142 It was the first crisis of the autocratic Muscovite state and it resulted 
in the strengthening of the autocratic state, demonstrating the conservative character of both the 
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elites and underclass.   The Time of Troubles saw a rejection of innovation in order to restore the 
old order.143  
There are multiple causes of the Time of Troubles.  Long term causes include the 
emergence of the fiscal-military state, peasant flight caused by economic downturn and the 
oprichnina of Ivan IV, and the imposition of state service.144  Short-term causes include the 
succession crisis brought about by the death of Fedor and the prior death of Ivan’s son Dmitry at 
Uglich in 1591, the famine of 1601-03, and existence of a credible pretender.  The famine of 1601 
placed considerable hardship on the peasants and the cities.  Peasants in the countryside were 
reduced to cannibalism.145  Boris Godunov was generous with relief efforts, yet this caused 
peasants to swell in the cities.146 The most decisive immediate cause was the succession crisis 
brought about by the end of the Rurikid line and the appearance of a pretender.  Rumors of 
Dmitry’s survival began to be heard in 1600.  Boris Godunov reacted to these rumors with 
increased repression and encouraged denunciations of boyars by their servants, rewarding 
generously the servant informers. 147 This demonstrates that Godunov thought that Dmitry was the 
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result of a boyar conspiracy. 148 Further, that is was Dmitry himself that Godunov feared, not just 
“the shade of Dmitry.”149 Dmitry´s appearance made the civil war possible.150  
 
Pushkin’s Pretender  
 Some have seen Pushkin’s Pretender as less a historical figure and more part of a 
meditation on the nature of Russian history, an exploration of determinacy and indeterminacy.  
The play, therefore, is most significant as an exposition on two approaches to history that are 
embodied by the Pretender and Boris Godunov.  Svetlana Evdokimova, for example, sees Dmitry 
as “chance incarnate.”151 The play is also ambiguous, with no clear winners.152 However, 
Pushkin’s pretender is more than a personification of invisible forces, he is a character drawn from 
historical reality and therefore a challenge to the regime.  Dmitry’s identity was and remains a 
topic of controversy.  Implying that Dmitry was anything more than a fraudulent pretender was 
subversive.  For example, the German playwright August von Kotzbue, who was murdered by 
Karl Sand, was forced by the Russian government to change the title of his play Demetrius 
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Iwonowitsch. Zaar von Moscau, removing the word ‘zaar’ so as not to indicate that Dmitry was 
anything but a pretender. There would be no Russian translation of this 1782 play published.153 
Karamzin described Dmitry as receiving an unprecedented welcome at the time of his entry 
to Moscow.154 Dmitry, according to Karamzin, “did have certain merits and a kindly disposition, 
but his temperament was romantic, and on the throne he resembled more a tramp than a king.” He 
then proceeds to list the deficiencies of Dmitry, describing him as “fond of foreigners” and 
“ignorant of the history of his alleged ancestors”.  Further, his “jolly amiability altogether 
overstepped the bounds of decorum and did violence to that majestic modesty which autocrats 
require” and worse, Dmitry “treated Russian customs and religion with open contempt.”155  This 
accusation would be echoed with regard to Peter the Great.  Unlike Peter, Dmitry did not root out 
and punish opposition.156 
Contemporary sources do not contradict this accusation, but instead provide justification. 
Conrad Bussow, Saxon mercenary participant and author of an account of the Time of Troubles, 
related how Dmitry did not keep Russian customs, after eating he avoided sleep by going for walks.  
Dmitry is described as well-educated with a degree of refinement.157  Jacques Margeret, who was 
a commander serving first Boris Godunov and later Dmitry, wrote: 
“As for the argument that he ridiculed the customs of the Russians and that 
he did not observe their religion except in form, it is not necessary to marvel 
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at this—especially if one considers their customs and life-styles, for they 
are ruse and gross, without any civility.  And Russia is a nation of liars, 
without loyalty, without law, without conscience- sodomites and corrupted 
by infinite vices and brutalities.  Boris Fedorovich, who was above 
suspicion, detested not so much the Russians as their vices, and he brought 
to the country what little reform there is.  How could Dmitrii (who knew 
something of the world, have been brought up for some time in Poland, 
which is a free country, and among the high nobles) have done less than to 
desire some reform and civility among his subjects.” 
 
Pushkin, like Karamzin, made Dmitry a romantic hero who preferred a brief active life to 
a long dull one- “en ce sens son Dimitrij prefigure le Pugachev de la Fille du capitaine et, par bien 
de cotes, est un personage dramatique plus reussi que Boris.”158 While also seeing him as a 
romantic figure, Pushkin presents Dmitry as a figure of real historical interest, likening him to 
Henry Navarre159:  
“Il y a beaucoup du Henri 4 dans Дмитрий. Il est comme lui brave, 
genereux et gascon, comme lui indifferent a la religion – tous deux abjurant 
leur foi pour cause politique, tous deux aimant les plaisirs et la guerre, tous 
deux donnant dans des [chimeres] projets chimeriques—[tout] tous duex en 
butte aux conspirations… Mais Henri 4 n’a pas a se reprocher Ксения – il 
est vrai que cette horrible accusation n’est pas prouvee et quant a mois je 
me fais une religion de ne pas y croire.”160  
Pushkin’s view of Dmitry as Henry IV indicates a positive attribute of Dmitry’s character.  He is 
able to rise above the conventions and confines of his time to manipulate history. The Pretender 
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is, therefore, a new kind of person.  He is a Europeanized Russian who was willing and able to 
create miracles and manipulate expectations.161  
But the most important departure from conventional Russian interpretations of Dmitry lies 
in the fact that his Dmitry had actual popular support. In Scene 12- “Cracow. 
Wisniowiecki’s House”, the noble Krushchov pays respect to the Pretender and vocalizes his 
support and the support of the boyars for the Pretender Dmitry.  Also, in this scene the audience 
learns that the Russian people also support Dmitry: 
    Всё тихо там еще. Но уж народ 
    Спасенне царевича проведал.162 
    Everything is quiet there—though the people know 
    The Tsarevich has been saved. 
This passage and the dialogue between the Pretender and Krushchov was deleted from the 1831 
version of the play erasing the support of Dmitry.  Scene 13, known as “Maryna’s Dressing Room” 
or “Palatine Mniszech’s Castle, Sambor”, was excluded from the 1831 version of the play 
completely.  In this scene the audience is again made aware of the people’s support and belief that 
Dmitry is the true tsar. Maryna states:  
    Он точно царский сын и признан целым светом.163 
    He is the son of a tsar—the whole world knows.  
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Pushkin’s portrayal of Dmitry as having the real support of the Russian people is aligned 
with contemporary sources.164  However, in portraying Dmitry as the monk Grigorii Otrepev, 
Pushkin departed from contemporary sources. Pushkin’s pretender is a conscious impostor. The 
audience is first introduced to Dmitry in Scene 5: “Night, a cell in the Chudov Monastery”.  The 
year is 1603.  The scene opens with Father Pimen writing by lamp light in a chronicle.  Sleeping 
Grigory is awakened by dreams.  We find in this scene that Grigory has been a monk from earliest 
age: 
    ...а я, от отроческих лет 
По келиям скитаюсь, бедный инок!165 
…Whilst I have been a monk 
From earliest youth, and trailed from cell to cell. 
He is young and eager for adventure:  
    Зачем и мне не тешиться в боях, 
Не пировать за царскою трапезой 
Why may not I participate in battle, 
Sit with the Tsar at table?  
 In this same scene, the audience finds that Pimen was witness to the death of the real Dmitry 
and that Boris was the one behind it. 
    … Тут народ 
Вслед бросился бежавшим трем убийцам; 
Укрывшихся злодеев захватили 
И привели пред теплый труп младенца, 
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И чудо – вдруг мертвец затрепетал –  
«Покайтеся» народ им загремел, 
И в ужасе под топором злоден 
Покаялись – и назвали Бориса.166  
…The people 
Rushed to pursue the three assassins, caught them, 
Brought them before the young boy’s corpse, still warm; 
And now, a miracle! – the body trembled. 
“Confess!” the people howled; and terror-struck, 
Beneath the axe, the three confessed – and Boris 
Was named. 
The real Dmitry is dead.  In Scene 6: “The Monastery Wall”, which was removed from the 1831 
edition, Grigory conspires with an evil monk who encourages Dmitry to pose as the tsarevich and 
explains: 
    Monk: 
    А бояре в Годунове помнят равного себе; 
Племя древнего Варяга и теперь любезно всем.167 
In Godunov the boyars remember an equal of themselves; 
Even today the old Varangian line is loved by all. 
Grigory responds:  
Решено 
Я – Димитрий, я – царевич  
Decided.   
I am Dimitry, the Tsarevich 
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This scene is important because it provides Dmitry with motive: fight against the usurper and the 
regicide Boris Godunov.  The idea to assume Dmitry’s identity was not his own, but he agreed to 
for a noble purpose.  Though a conscious impostor, Dmitry is not motived for dark or selfish 
reasons, as Godunov propaganda alleged.168 
In Scene 15- “Night. Garden. Fountain” Dmitry reveals his true identity to Maryna, 
daughter of the Polish lord Mniszech. In this scene Pushkin portrays Dmitry as a figure of romantic 
sentiment who is smitten by Maryna.  
 Она...вся кровь во мне остановилась.  
She…she stops my blood. 
Maryna probes for his true identity:  
 ...Знай: отдаю торжественно я руку 
Наследнику московского престола, 
Царевичу, спасенному судьбой. 
No, not the callow captive of my beauty, 
But he whom fate has favored, the Tsarevich, 
He who shall sit upon the throne of Moscow 
Shall be the one to whom I give my hand. 
 He reveals to her that he is in fact not Dmitry but a runaway monk. 
    ...Нет полно: 
Я не хочу делиться с мертвецом 
Любовницей, ему принадлежащей 
Нет, полно мне притворствовать! Скажу 
Всю истину; так знай же: твой Димитрий 
Давно погиб, зарыт – и не воскреснет; 
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А хочешь ли ты знать, кто я таков? 
Изволь; скажу: я бедный черноризец; 
…There, enough 
I will not share my loved one with a corpse. 
No more dissembling, now the truth: Dimitry 
Was dead and buried long ago; he’ll not 
Come back to life.  You’ll ask, then – who am I? 
I’ll tell you who I am – a wretched monk.   
  Further, he says that it does not matter if he is the real Dmitry or not: 
    Димитрий я иль нет – что им за дело? 
Но я предлог раздоров и войны. 
Им ето лишь и нужно, и тебя, 
Мятежница! Поверь, молчать заставят.169 
Whether or not I really am Dimitry;  
I am the pretext for war,  
And that is all the world requires of me. 
Should you oppose me—you will soon be silenced. 
 
The Real Dmitry 
In reality, Dmitry’s identity is unclear. Documents relating to his brief reign were ordered 
by Shuisky to be destroyed.170  Contemporary accounts of Dmitry are split.  Jacques Margeret 
believed Dmitry to be the true son of Ivan IV, while Conrad Bussow believed him to be the 
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illegitimate son of Stephan Bathory, King of Poland.171 The monk Grigory Otrepev actively sought 
out a Polish youth who had the appearance of Dmitry. Bussow claimed that Lord Basmanov, 
commander of the tsar’s army, admitted that Dmitry was not the true son of Ivan, “but he is still 
our sovereign.  We have recognized him and sworn allegiance to him, and we will never find a 
better sovereign in Russia.”172 Bussow also claimed to have heard from a very old Muscovite, aged 
105 years, that though Dmitry was brave and prudent, he was not the son of Ivan for the old man 
had seen the dead child Dmitry after his murder. To Bussow, Dmitry was a foreigner whom the 
Muscovites embraced to rid themselves of Boris Godunov. 173   
Further, historians have followed in the path of anti-Dmitry propaganda created by both 
the Godunov and Shuisky regimes intended to discredit the Pretender.174 Scholars have aligned 
the identities of Grigory Otrepev and Dmitry.175  Russian Historian Ruslan Skrynnikov, for 
example titled the first chapter of his work on the Time of Troubles “Rule by A Monk”.176 Dmitry 
has also been portrayed in a negative light as an adventurer or manipulator, even a sorcerer.177  
However, other scholars have seen Dmitry as an enlightened figure, a forerunner to Peter the Great, 
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who was also maligned as the anti-Christ.178 Contemporary sources do attest to the enlightened 
character of Dmitry:  
“for Dmitrii made them feel little by little that this was a free country, 
governed by a clement prince…He sometimes showed a bit too much 
familiarity towards the lords, who are brought up in such subjection and fear 
that they would almost not dare to speak in the presence of their prince 
without command.  However, the emperor knew otherwise how to maintain 
a majesty and grandeur worthy of the prince that he was.  Moreover, he was 
wise, having enough understanding to serve as a schoolteacher to all his 
council. ”179 
 This same source argues that he was not and could not have been the runway monk 
Grigory. Jacques Margeret responded to claims that Dmitry was the run-away monk Grigory.  He 
found these claims weak and provided evidence to the contrary.  Firstly, the two men were not the 
same age.  Margeret says that Dmitry was under twenty-five, while Otrepev was in his mid-thirties.  
Further, the monk Otrepev was seen alive after Dmitry’s assassination.  Lastly, Margeret claimed 
that the same person who was known to have seen Otrepev after Dmitry’s death, also claimed that 
Otrepev stated that Dmitry was the true son of Ivan IV. 180 
Further, Shuisky had to assassinate Dmitry because these claims against him were not 
credible.181 Both Shuisky and Godunov took the pretender’s claim very seriously and put 
considerable energy into propaganda campaigns against Dmitry. For example, Shuisky and 
accomplices read letters claiming that Dmitry intended to give significant Russian lands over to 
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Poland.182  Shuisky went so far as to dig up the body of the supposedly real Dmitry and have him 
canonized as a saint.183 Dmitry’s own behavior is also worth noting. He lacked any suspicion of 
his subjects loyalty.184  Whereas Boris had encouraged servants to inform in masters after Dmitry’s 
existence was made known.185  Neither did Dmitry behave in a way so as to prevent criticism: 
“if Dmitrii felt himself culpable, he would have worked above all and 
everywhere to please the Russians. He knew very well that Boris could do 
no more to discredit him than to call him a heretic.  Thus, he would not have 
allowed any Jesuits to enter Moscow.  He knew well enough that Boris had 
incurred the ill will of the Russian people by trying to ally himself with a 
foreign prince, so Dmitrii might have prevented this ill will by allying 
himself with a Russian house, as his predecessors had done.”186  
Dmitry had no need for purges or terror to maintain power.187  Further, Dmitry was known to show 
clemency and had even pardoned Shuisky, which was his gravest mistake as Vasily Shuisky was 
behind his assassination.188 
Nor was he simply a pretext for war. Discussions of the Time of Troubles interpreting the 
era as an example of class war or peasant war diminish the significance of Dmitry’s identity.189 If 
the real significance of the Time of Troubles is the spontaneous mass uprising against enserfment, 
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then the figure of Dmitry is not important.190  However, Dmitry ´s identity provided the trigger for 
the civil war as he was believed to be by many the true son Ivan IV.191 As Chester Dunning states, 
“Far from being a mere figurehead under whom Russian rebels could pursue their own agenda, 
Dmitrii turns out to have been a remarkable character who seems to have truly believed he was the 
son of Ivan the Terrible and would, with God’s help, win the throne of Russia."192  
 Pushkin portrayed Dmitry as a conscious pretender and romantic figure.  He not only 
challenged the regime through his portrayal of Tsar Dmitry, he also touched on a more critical 
subject: popular consciousness and support of autocracy.  The following chapter will discuss 
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AUTOCRACY AND THE NAROD  
...Попробуй самозванец 
Им посулить старинный Юрьев день, 
Так и пойдет потеха.193 
…Should the Pretender promise  
The Restoration of St. George’s Day – 
Then the fun will begin.   
 
 
In August of 1851, on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Nicholas I’s coronation, the autocrat 
visited Moscow and performed the ceremonial triple bow from the Red Staircase.  This symbolic 
act was meant to show the relationship of the tsar to the Russian people and also the distinction 
between the Russian people and their Western counterparts.  In this act, the tsar acknowledged the 
people’s love as the source of his unlimited power and also acknowledged that this love is a 
defining characteristic of the Russian people.194  The Russian people naturally embrace autocracy, 
unlike Western Europeans who are subjugated by conquest.    
This interpretation of Russian history is commonly referred to as the Norman Theory and 
used as justification for autocratic government in Russia.  Nineteenth century historians like 
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Mikhail Pogodin and Nikolai Karamzin, who supported autocracy, took their proof from the 
Primary Chronicle, which states that in 862: 
“The Slavs, the tributaries, of the Varangians drove them back beyond the 
sea and, refusing them further tribute, set out to govern themselves.  There 
was no law among them, but tribe rose against tribe.  Discord thus ensued 
among them, and they began to war one against another.  They said to 
themselves, ‘Let us seek a prince who may rule over use, and judge us 
according to the law.’  They accordingly went overseas to the Varangian 
Rus…”195   
Conservative historian Mikhail Pogodin referred to this voluntary choice as “the first essential 
distinction in the kernel, the seed of the Russian state.”196 In the West, absolute monarchy was 
imposed, but in Russia it was embraced voluntarily.   
As time passed and autocracy became more entrenched with the centralization of Muscovy, 
“The people, delivered by the princes of Moscow from the disaster of internecine wars as well as 
from the foreign yoke, felt no regrets for the ancient veche or for the dignitaries who used to 
restrain the sovereign’s authority, the people did not argue over rights.”197 In the nineteenth 
century, Slavophiles viewed the apolitical tendencies of the Russian people as proof of the Slavic 
people’s purity, rightly eschewing the corrupting influences of government.198  Westernizers 
viewed it as proof of Russia’s inadequacy need for outside influences. Alexander Herzen, for 
example, wrote, “The receptive character of the Slavs, their femininity, their lack of initiative, and 
their great capacity for assimilation and adaption, made the pre-eminently a people that stands in 
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need of other peoples; they are not self-sufficing.”199 Further, Vissarion Belinsky wrote, in a letter 
to a friend, that  
“Peter is clear evidence that Russia will not develop her liberty and her civil 
structure out of her own resources, but will obtain it at the hands of her tsars 
as so much else…To give Russia in her present state a constitution is to ruin 
her.  To our people liberty simply means license. The liberated Russian 
nation would not go to a parliament, but run to the taverns to drink wine, 
break glass, and hang the gentry because they shave their beards and wear 
European clothes…The hope of Russia is education, not…revolutions and 
constitutions…”200  
Even radicals and revolutionaries held that the narod was politically impotent. Nikolai 
Mikhailovskii, a radical who disagreed with idealizations of peasantry and contributor to Annals 
of the Fatherland (Otechestvennye Zapiski), wrote that ¨the voice of the countryside too often 
contradicts its own interests.”201 Peasants do not understand their own interests and must be led by 
revolutionary elite. Though to radicals like Mikhailovskii, this was the result of centuries of 
bondage, not natural disposition. 
The Russian narod has been characterized as superstitious and apathetic, yet prone to 
violent, irrational action when provoked. Further, the narod is never provoked for a rational or just 
cause but willing to believe in anyone promising material advancement. This characterization of 
the Russian people was persistent, leading the view that Russian rebellions and revolutions are 
especially dangerous and destructive:  
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“A political revolution is not possible in Russia…The Russian masses, 
whether workmen or peasants, are not looking for political rights, which 
they neither want nor comprehend…The peasant dreams of obtaining a 
gratuitous share of somebody else’s land; the workman, of getting hold of 
the entire capital and profits of the manufacturer.  Beyond this, they have 
no aspirations.  If these slogans are scattered far and wide among the 
populace…Russia will be flung into anarchy.”202  
Historians have echoed these viewpoints in describing peasant action in Russia.  For example, 
Richard Pipes opened a discussion on peasant disturbances writing that “once a century, Russian 
peasants went on a rampage, killing landlords and officials, burning estates and seizing 
properties.”203  The lethargic Russian people are unable to understand their own interests, and 
under the right circumstances will erupt with violent irrational fury. Characterizations of Pushkin 
as a supporter of Autocracy have argued that Pushkin agreed with these views and refer to a quote 
removed from the final published version of Captain’s Daughter referring to the “senseless and 
ruthless”204 Russian rebellion as well as the silent ending of the 1831 version of Boris Godunov. 
Yet, in the 1825 version of Boris Godunov, Pushkin depicted a narod that was conscious, 
responsive and active. Pushkin’s interpretation challenged Official Nationality, the Slavophiles, 
and the Westernizers.  
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Apathy and the Russian Narod 
 In scene 11, the reader sees Vasily Shuisky in 1603 speaking with Tsar Boris about the 
appearance of the Pretender Dmitry.  Here Shuisky articulates the attitude of the Russian ruling 
classes concerning the character of the narod: 
Но знаешь сам: бессмысленная чернь 
Изменчива, мятежна, суеверна, 
Легко пустой надежде предана, 
Мгновенному внушению послушна, 
Для истины глуха и равнодушна, 
А баснями питается она.205 
 
But as you know too well, the senseless mob 
Is superstitious, fickle and rebellious, 
Often attached to insubstantial goals, 
Responsive to the passions of the season, 
Deaf and indifferent to the voice of reason 
Ready to feed its mind on fairy- tales.  
It has been argued that Pushkin shared this view of the Russian people. This play has been seen by 
scholars as Pushkin’s indictment of the apathy of the Russian narod and therefore his support of 
autocracy as the most appropriate form of government for such a people. It is fruit of his mature 
mind leaving behind the idealism of his youth and instead embracing the pillars of Official 
Nationality.206  It is said that Pushkin uses the scenes with the narod to expose the people´s political 
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indifference.  The confused and passive masses obey orders, lacking understanding and the ability 
to question.207  The ending of the 1831 version of the play is given as proof of the narod’s inertia.  
Scene 23- “The Kremlin. House of the Godunovs”, the final lines of the play: 
Мосальский: 
Народ! Мария Годунова и сын ее Феодор отравили 
себя ядом.  Мы видели их мертвые трупы. (Народ 
в ужасе молчит.) Что ж вы молчите?  Кричите: да 




People! Maria Godunova and her son Feodor have 
taken poison.  We have seen their dead bodies. (The 
people are silent in horror.) Why are you silent? 
Shout: “Long live Tsar Dimitry Ivanovich!” 
The People are silent.209 
End. 
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This ending has been viewed differently over time.  At the end of the 19th century, it was seen as 
another example of Pushkin following the lead of his mentor Karamzin.210  In the 1930s, it was 
viewed as the narod’s rejection of the Pretender.  More recently, it has been seen that this ending 
was Pushkin’s deliberate attempt as an artistic to frustrate audience expectations of catharsis and 
illustrate the powerlessness of the narod.211 
However, at the end 1825 version, the narod responds by cheering: Да здравствует царь 
Дмитрий Иванович!212 This ending is historically accurate and reflected contemporary 
sources.213 This ending also provides unity to the play, as the narod were forced to cheer for Tsar 
Boris in the “Maiden’s Field” scene, but then cheered with enthusiasm for Dmitry.214 Some 
scholars have argued that the ending does not make a difference, the narod is inert and apathetic 
in either reading, the narod’s cheer or silence are essentially the same.215  However, this cannot 
be.  Such a reading hinges upon a negative portrayal of Dmitry and the narod. The previous chapter 
has discussed Pushkin’s interpretation of Dmitry.  The following pages will explore how Pushkin 
portrayed the narod. 
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 In Pushkin’s play the narod is not passive but active, with their own mind.  For example 
in  scene 18- “Square in Front of the Cathedral”. Moscow, the narod vocalize their unwillingness 
to accept the idea that Dmitry was the monk Grigory Otrepev: 
   Другой 




Пускай себе проклинают; царевичу дела нет до Отрепьева. 
Другой 
А царевичу поют теперь вечную память. 
Первый 
Вечную память живому! Вот ужо им будет, безбожникам.216 
Second  
I was standing on the porch and I heard the Deacon shout: “Grishka 
Otrepiev—he shall be Anathema!” 
First 
They can curse ‘im’s much as they like – the Tsarevich ain’t got nothin’ 
To do with Otrepiev 
Second 
Now they’re chanting eternal remembrance for the Tsarevich. 
First 
Eternal remembrance for the living! They’ll catch it for that, the godless 
scoundrels. 
 
                                                 




The narod’s support of Dmitry was not just controversial in Pushkin’s day.  Their support of 
Dmitry was actually a source of embarrassment for scholars in the Soviet era.217  During the 1930s, 
it was held that Pushkin, the “people’s poet”, intended to show the narod as heroic.218  However, 
at this point in time Dmitry was seen as nothing more than a puppet of Poland.  Therefore, the 
narod had to reject Dmitry.  However, this scene does not illustrate rejection but support.  The 
reason for support: belief in the true and rightful tsar.   
 The support shown above appears especially authentic when combined with what was 
scene 3 in the 1825 version “Maiden’s Field”.  This scene uses comic elements to show a narod 
that is impertinent and only showing outward support of Tsar Boris.  The people are shown to be 
crying because it is expected of them: 
     Один 
     (Михо) 
    О чем мы плачем? 
     Другой 
    А как нам знать? То ведают бояре, 
    Не нам чета. 
     First 
     (In a low voice) 
    Why are they weeping? 
     Second 
    How should we know?  The boyars,  
    They’ll know, it’s not our business. 
Yet, the tears do not come: 
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     Первый 
    Я также.  Нет ли луку? 
    Потрем глаза. 
     Второй 
    Нет, я слюней помажу. 
    Что там еще?219 
     Another 
    The same with me.  If only we had an onion 
    To rub our eyes with. 
     Second 
    Have to make do with spit. 
    What’s happening now? 
The people have the consciousness to know that outward signs of their approval is expected of 
them.220 The idea for fake tears did not come from Karamzin, but instead from Mikhail 
Shcherbatov and Russian chronicles.221  The comic elements in this scene adds a hint of subversive 
potential. Without this scene, the reader would only see the narod in the second scene awaiting the 
news of Boris’s accession with few lines and then not again until much later on.  Without this 
scene to develop the character of a bold narod, the narod seem servile and superstitious when 
encountered again in scene 18.  After scene 18, the narod is only met again at the end of the play 
where they curse the Godunovs and cheer for Dmitry.222 
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The Decisive Issue: Serfdom  
The Time of Troubles resulted in the strengthening of the autocratic state and its supporting 
institution: serfdom.  Peasants in Russia had been tenant farmers, never actually owning title to 
their land.  Tenant farmers finding themselves in debt to their landlord were prohibited from 
moving until their debts had been paid, with one exception: St. George’s Day.223  St. George’s Day 
in November, prior to the enserfment of peasants, had been the day when peasants could change 
their landlords.  St. George’s Day had been temporarily suspended in 1580, but then permanently 
suspended in 1603 by Boris Godunov.224 The Time of Troubles, therefore, resulted in the 
strengthening of serfdom. In a way this was just:      
“The peasants, although compelled to accept a burdensome serfdom, saw a 
rude sort of justice in the service state, which required landowners to serve 
the tsar just as the peasants were compelled to serve their masters, the 
landowners.  Moreover, the holy figure of a distant tsar, chosen by God for 
his high office, and himself God’s servant, fitted peasant expectations better 
than an elective monarchy, hampered at every turn by a landowner’s 
assembly where peasants had neither voice nor sympathy, could ever do.  If 
government were inescapable and an evil- as Russians, along with all other 
peasants, no doubt felt- at least the autocratic, Orthodox tsar, as mirrored 
forth once more by Michael Romanov, was an intelligible power-wielder.  
His oppressions were the more tolerable because he oppressed everyone, 
rich and poor, landholder and cultivator, merchant and soldier.”225 
 
Just like Pushkin departed from contemporary sources on the identity of Dmitry, he also 
departed from sources on the reason for the people’s support of Dmitry.  In the 1825 Komediia, 
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Pushkin controversially ties the people’s support of Dmitry with the issue of enserfment, as seen 
in scene 10 quoted at the beginning of this chapter.  This scene contains the first written claim that 
Dmitry was supported because people expected him to abolish serfdom.226  Oddly, this seen was 
not edited out of the play, even though this topic was highly contentious.  The most likely reason 
given to explain the failure of the censors to remove the reference is the simple failure of the 
censors to recognize the reference.227     
 
Why did people support Dmitry? 
 Pushkin was historically accurate for depicting Dmitry with real popular support, yet 
incorrect about the issue generating support. Why did the Russian people support Dmitry?  
Pushkin’s linking the people’s support with the expectation of the abolition of serfdom anticipated 
future historians that would interpret the Time of Troubles through the lens of class conflict.  For 
example, Skrynnikov wrote that the Pretender, whom he held to be the monk Otrepev, gained the 
throne because there existed a “mighty revolutionary movement” that gained force because the 
abolition of St. George’s Day meant that “only force could contain feudal arbitraries”, resulting in 
a social explosion from the bottom.228 
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 The interpretation of the Time of Troubles as a peasant war or social revolution ignores the 
realities of 16th century popular consciousness and minimizes the role of Dmitry.  The Time of 
Troubles was not about serfdom, and in fact serfs had only minimal involvement.229 It was instead 
about a specific worldview and expectations. Dmitry was not supported because of utopian 
expectations, but because of his supposed blood connection to Ivan IV, who in popular 
consciousness figured as the “good tsar” who would protect peasants from oppressive boyars.230  
Dmitry was identified with the “good tsar” and presented himself with a believable causal story to 
a population that believed in and expected miracles.231  Dmitry was supported not for what actions 
he might take, but for who he was believed to be: son of Ivan IV. The people had incurred divine 
wrath by allowing themselves to be ruled by an evil usurper.232 The injustice had to be rectified.  
The cause of the true tsar drew support from all social classes.  The Russian people in this 
circumstance were neither apathetic nor apolitical.  Neither were they proto-revolutionaries.  
 Time of Troubles does illustrate that at least aspect of the 16th/17th century: the Russian 
people did love their tsars. In this respect, the Time of Troubles is congruent with the ideals of the 
Slavophiles and Official Nationality, the Russian people in support of Dmitry were not rising up 
against their autocrat but in support of what they thought of as the true autocratic system, as 
Dunning has demonstrated. “If there were disturbances, they concerned the question of legitimacy 
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of a particular ruler: of Boris, of the False Dmitrii, or of Shuiskii.  But a voice never sounded 
among the people: we do not want monarchy, we do not want autocracy, we do not want the tsar.  
On the contrary, in 1612, having defeated the enemy and being left without a tsar, the people, 














                                                 








Как бы сказать? по-русски – виршеписец 
Иль скоморох.234   
How shall I say? 
In Russian- a scribbler of verses, or a minstrel. 
 
 Pushkin challenged official identity and official memory.  Unfortunately, official memory 
and the official interpretation of events during the Time of Troubles are ultimately what became 
part of Pushkin’s body of works and were used to discern the poet’s stance on Russian history.  
However, it has been demonstrated that it is misleading to view the 1831 version of the play as 
representative of anyone’s vision but that of Tsar Nicholas I. 235   In this way, before Pushkin’s 
death, Nicholas I laid the foundation for the development of the image of Pushkin as a supporter 
of Official Nationality. Following generations of scholars proceeded to define Pushkin’s 
relationship to Dmitry, autocracy and the potential of the Russian narod on a version of a play that 
did not accurately represent his potential either as a poet or a scholar.  Restoration of the Pushkin’s 
Comedy has furthered the view of Pushkin as a critical thinker. It demonstrates that Pushkin went 
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beyond articulating Russian identity in terms of West or East, and addressed institutions and 
relationships. 
 In this play, Pushkin challenged the notion of a passive people dependent on an autocratic 
system.  In rehabilitating the image of the Pretender Dmitry he also challenged the official 
historical narrative of the founding events of Romanov Dynasty236. Finally, in linking Dmitry’s 
support with the issue of serfdom, Pushkin challenged the supporting institution of Russian 
autocracy and ventured to touch on the most controversial issue of his time.237  This play was in 
fact subversive and shows that Pushkin did not embrace conservative ideology.  Yet, Pushkin 
should not be considered a supporter of class-leveling revolution as he praised Nicholas I for 
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